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Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to 
greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a 
Taylor rule model in which real time expected inflation and output are used. We use five 
indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory 
statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that 
even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add 
information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when 
the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators 
remain significant. 
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Since monetary policy is increasingly becoming the art of managing expectations, 
communication has developed into a key instrument in the central bankers’ toolbox. 
Greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central 
bank actions, which, in turn, reduces uncertainty in financial markets. Nowadays, there is 
a strongly held belief among central bankers that a high degree of predictability is 
important. According to Poole (2001, p. 9), “The presumption must be that market 
participants make more efficient decisions … when markets can correctly predict central 
bank actions.” 
The extent to which central bank communication has been successful is very 
much an empirical issue. Therefore, it is no surprise that the empirical literature on 
central bank communication has seen major developments in recent years.
1 Many of 
these studies refer to the communication policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
There is substantive evidence that ECB communications move financial markets in the 
intended direction (see, for instance, Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007, Musard-Gies, 2006, 
and Brand et al., 2006). There is also a consensus that ECB communications increase the 
predictability of interest decisions by the ECB (De Haan, 2008). However, there is less 
agreement as to whether communication adds information compared to the information 
contained by macroeconomic variables that are typically included in a model based on 
the Taylor rule. For instance, whereas Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) and Rosa and 
Verga (2007) conclude that communication adds information not provided by these 
macroeconomic variables, Jansen and De Haan (2009) find that straightforward Taylor 
rule models outperform models using only communication indicators. These different 
outcomes can be caused by many factors, including the use of different indicators of ECB 
communication and different specifications of the Taylor rule model.
2  
                                                 
1 See Blinder et al. (2008) for an extensive survey. See also Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009). 
2 Whereas Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) and Rosa and Verga (2007) use communication indicators that 
are based on the introductory statement of the ECB’s President at the press conference following the ECB 
policy meeting, Jansen and De Haan (2009) employ an indicator based on Bloomberg news reports. Also 
the estimated Taylor rule models differ across these studies.    3
Taylor (1993) suggested that a simple monetary policy rule relating the nominal 
short-term interest rate to inflation and the output gap accurately describes U.S. monetary 
policy over the period 1987-1992. The Taylor rule seems a reasonable description of 
central bank behaviour in other countries as well. However, as Svensson (2003) has 
shown, even if the ultimate objective of monetary policy is to stabilize inflation and 
output, a simple Taylor rule will not be optimal in a reasonable macroeconomic model. 
Interest rate changes affect inflation and output with a sizable lag. Therefore, monetary 
policy has to be forward-looking, i.e., it should be based on expected inflation and output. 
Some recent studies suggest that the use of expectations lead to very different estimates 
of a Taylor rule model for the ECB (Sauer and Sturm, 2007 and Gorter et al., 2008).  
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine to what extent ECB communication 
adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which 
expected inflation and output are used when forecasting upcoming interest rate decisions. 
Most previous studies examining this issue used backward looking Taylor rule 
specifications. Employing various indicators of ECB communication that are all based on 
the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB 
policy meeting, we find that ECB communication turns out to be significant in our Taylor 
rule model. In other words, it is worthwhile for financial market participants to read the 
ECB President’s lips, as this adds information about upcoming interest rate decisions that 
is not provided by expected inflation and expected output growth. This conclusion holds 
even when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model. 
 
1. THE MODEL 
According to the Taylor rule, in setting its policy instrument (it) the central bank should 
react to deviations of inflation (πt) from its target (π*) and to deviations of output (yt) 
from potential (y*): 
 
it = (r*+π*) + β(πt–π*) + γ(yt–y*), (1) 
   4
where r* is the neutral real interest rate, and γ>0, β>1.
3 As the ECB is known not to focus 
on the output gap (Gerlach, 2007), probably in view of the difficulty to measure it in a 
real time situation, we estimate a Taylor rule using output growth. Walsh (2004) and 
Gerberding et al. (2004) argue that such a rule performs well in the presence of imperfect 
information. We assume a constant potential growth rate and include Δ(yt–y*) instead of 
(yt–y*): 
 
it = (r*+π*) + β(πt–π*) + γ(Δyt–Δy*). (2) 
 
Most previous studies that estimated a Taylor rule for the ECB used data for the 
actual (ex-post) inflation rate and the output gap. Svensson (2003) has shown that even if 
the ultimate objective of monetary policy is to stabilize inflation and output, a simple 
Taylor rule will not be optimal in a reasonable macroeconomic model. Because interest 
rate changes affect inflation and output with a sizable lag, monetary policy has to be 
forward-looking, i.e., it should be based on expected inflation and output. Sauer and 
Sturm (2007) and Gorter et al. (2008) therefore estimate Taylor rules using forward-
looking (and real-time) data. Similarly, our model is defined as: 
 
it = (r*+π*) + β(Etπt+12–π*) + γ(EtΔyt+12–Δy*), (3) 
 
where Et is the expectations operator and the time index now refers to months.
4 
Generally, central banks adjust interest rates in small steps to the target rate i
T
t 




t = (r*+π*) + β(Etπt+12–π*) + γ(EtΔyt+12–Δy*). (4) 
 
                                                 
3  According to the “Taylor principle”, β>1, i.e., if inflation increases the nominal interest rate must 
increase more (Δi>Δπ) in order to raise the real rate. 
4 Data restrictions force us to use a lead of 12 months.   5
The actual interest rate, it, adjusts only slowly to this target, i.e.: 
 
it = ρit-1 + (1 – ρ)i
T




Δit = (1 – ρ)(i
T
t – it-1) + vt , (6) 
 
where ρ denotes the smoothing parameter and vt = δvt-1+εt. The observed inertia may also 
be explained by serially correlated error terms in the policy rule (omitted shocks like 
financial crises) (see Rudebusch, 2002). 
 
2. DATA 
Our data refer to the Euro area over the period 1999–2007, although some ECB 
communication indicators are only available for a shorter period. Our dependent variable 
is the Main Refinancing Rate (MRR) as determined by the ECB Governing Council 
(source: ECB). Real-time expected inflation and output growth time series have been 
constructed from Consensus Economics forecasts. These forecasts are used as a proxy for 
the ECB’s expectations of inflation and output growth. The Consensus data are unique, 
not revised and, consequently, not subject to the real-time critique of Orphanides (2001).
5 
Every month, major banks and forecast institutes in the EMU-countries give their 
forecasts for the near future, i.e., the current and the next year. Euro area expected 
inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) growth series are constructed from these 
forecasts for all euro area countries except Luxembourg.
6 
                                                 
5 Orphanides (2001) has shown that the use of real-time instead of ex post data leads to very different 
estimated coefficients in Taylor rule models for the Federal Reserve. 
6 To convert the reported growth rates into monthly moving figures, we take as the 12-month forecast the 
weighted average of the forecast for the current and the following year, where the weights are x/12 for the x 
remaining months in the current year and (12-x)/12 for the following year’s forecast. As the survey is 
   6
 
[Insert Figure 1: Economic variables included in the Taylor rule model] 
 
Figure 1 shows the MRR and expected inflation and expected output growth. In 
addition, the one-month Interbank Rate (IBR) is shown. As part of our robustness 
analysis, the difference between the MRR and the IBR is included as an additional 
control variable. Not surprisingly, both interest rates move closely together. Expected 
output growth and the MRR also move together to some extent, while the co-movement 
of expected inflation and the MRR seems to be limited since expected inflation hovers 
around the ECB’s medium term objective of an inflation rate below, but close to 2 
percent.  
Various approaches have been developed in the literature to measure (the effects) 
of central bank communication (see Blinder et al., 2008 for more details). Starting with 
Kohn and Sack (2004), various studies have examined the effects of central bank 
communication events on the volatility of financial variables. The basic idea is that, if 
communications affect the returns on financial assets, the volatility of these returns 
should be higher on days of central bank communications, ceteris paribus, because the 
signals contain “news.” Focusing on volatility makes it unnecessary to assign a direction 
to each statement. The most important weakness of this approach is that it cannot assess 
whether markets moved in the “right” direction. In other words, the Kohn and Sack 
approach may establishes that central bank communication creates news, but it is unable 
to determine whether it reduces noise. 
In another approach, communication is quantified in order to assess both the 
direction and magnitude of its effects on asset prices—and thus to determine to what 
extent communication has its intended effects. Communications must be classified 
according to their content and/or likely intention, and then coded on a numerical scale. 
Negative (positive) values are assigned to communications that are perceived as dovish 
                                                                                                                                                 
conducted at the beginning of each month, we consider the current month to belong to the remaining 
months in the current year.    7
(hawkish), and zero to those that appear to be neutral. Whereas some researchers restrict 
the coding to directional indications by using a scale between –1 and +1 (e.g., Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher, 2007), others assign a finer grid that is at least suggestive of magnitude, 
e.g., by coding statements on a scale from -2 to +2 (e.g., Berger et al., 2006). The most 
important weakness of the second approach is that it is necessarily subjective, and there 
may be misclassifications. Indeed, various indicators that are based on the same 
information set differ quite substantially from one another, as we will show.  
The ECB’s most important communication device is the President’s introductory 
statement at the monthly press conference in which he reports on the decisions taken by 
the ECB’s Governing Council (De Haan, 2008). Following meetings of the Council, 
which typically take place on the first Thursday of each month, the ECB announces the 
monetary policy decisions at 13:45 (CET). Some 45 minutes later, at around 14:30, the 
ECB President and Vice-President hold a press conference that comprises two elements: 
a prepared introductory statement that contains the background considerations for the 
monetary policy decision, and a Questions & Answers (Q&A) part during which the 
President and the Vice-President are available to answer questions by the attending 
journalists. The introductory statement is understood to reflect the position and views of 
the Council, agreed upon on a word-by-word basis by its members. 
In our analysis we include five indicators that are all based on the introductory 
statement by the ECB President, namely an updated version of the index of Rosa and 
Verga (2007),
7 the aggregate index of Berger et al. (2006), the index of Heinemann and 
Ullrich (2007), the KOF Monetary Policy Communicator (MPC) as published by the 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute and used by Conrad and Lamla (2007)
8, and the indicator 
of Ullrich (2008).
9  
                                                 
7 The original Rosa and Verga index ends in 2004. Carlo Rosa kindly provided an updated version of their 
indicator which allows us to also use more recent years. 
8 Available at: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/communicator 
9 Katrin Ullrich kindly provided her indicator. Other ECB communication indicators are based on other 
communication devices and are therefore not included. The index of Musard-Gies (2006) is only available 
for a short period and is therefore not included.    8
Different from the other indicators, the KOF MPC is based on the interpretation 
of the introductory statements by the ECB President by Media Tenor, a media research 
institute. Media analysts read the text of the introductory statement of the monthly press 
conference sentence by sentence and code them. The coding is aggregated by the KOF 
Swiss Economic Institute into an index by taking balances of the statements that reveal 
that the ECB sees upside risks to future price stability and statements that reveal that the 
ECB sees downside risks to future price stability, relative to all statements about future 
price stability (including neutral ones). Hence, in contrast to the other communication 
indicators we consider, it only takes forward-looking statements into account. By 
construction, the values of the KOF MPC are restricted to be in the range of minus one to 
plus one. The larger a positive (negative) value of the KOF MPC, the stronger the ECB 
communicated that there are upside (downside) risks for future price stability. 
 
[Insert Figure 2: The ECB communication indicators] 
 
Figure 2 shows the various ECB communication indicators that we use, while 
Table 1 shows the correlation of the various indicators. It becomes clear that the 
indicators are sometimes quite different from one another. Whereas the correlation 
coefficients amongst the first three indicators compiled by economists are around 0.8, 
their correlation with the KOF MPC is more modest.  
 
[Insert Table 1: Correlation matrix] 
 
The next step in our analysis is to estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule model 
for the ECB and to augment this model with the ECB communication indicators outlined 
above.
10 As we are using daily information (aggregated to a monthly level), we need to 
                                                 
10 Using a different methodology that we cannot employ due to lack of sufficient variability of our interest 
rate data, Kim et al. (2008) also estimate various Taylor rule models in their analysis of the predictability of 
interest rate decisions by the Bank of England. These authors do not include central bank communication in 
their model.    9
decide at which moment in time to forecast the next interest rate decision. Two moments 
in time appear natural: i) at the day of and directly after the previous policy decision, and 
ii) the day the new Consensus forecasts are released (see Figure 3). At that day, there is 
new information on expected inflation and expected growth. We have decided to focus on 
the second option as it will be the hardest test for the ECB communication indicators to 
have any affect at all. After all, in this set-up information provided by the ECB 
communication is already captured in the Consensus forecasts and the interbank rate.  
 
[Insert Figure 3: The timing in our model] 
 
3.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 2 shows our baseline model, i.e., the model without communication indicators and 
without the interbank rate. This model is first estimated with OLS as this allows 
transforming the estimated coefficients into the underlying structural parameters. All 
estimated coefficients are significant and have the expected sign. The structural 
parameters show that the results are in line with the so-called Taylor principle (i.e., β>1 
(or κ>0)). According to the Taylor principle, if inflation increases the nominal interest 
rate must increase more (i.e., Δi>Δπ) in order to raise the real rate. If this principle is 
violated, self-fulfilling bursts of inflation may be possible. The estimates also suggest that 
the MA(1) term is insignificant, i.e., δ=0 (not shown). 
As the ECB sets interest rates in steps and only discrete changes are observed, we 
prefer estimating ordered probit models. So in the remainder of the paper, all reported 
results refer to ordered probit estimates. The change in the main refinancing rate is 
transferred into a (-1,0,1)-dummy to reflect interest cuts, no changes, and interest rate 
increases.
11 The final column of Table 2 shows the ordered probit results for the baseline 
model. They are similar to the OLS estimates. 
 
                                                 
11 The results do not change in any meaningful way in case we distinguish between 50 and 25 basis point 
changes.   10
[Insert Table 2: Baseline model: OLS and ordered probit models] 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results if we add the various ECB 
communication indicators. In each regression we use the maximum number of 
observations possible. However, the conclusions are the same if we restrict the sample to 
those 64 observations (basically the 1999-2004 period) for which all indicators are 
available (results are available on request). The difference between both tables is that in 
Table 4 also the interbank rate is included as explanatory variable.   
 
[Insert Table 3: Ordered probit results with ECB communication indicators added] 
 
[Insert Table 4: Ordered probit results including communication indicators and the 
interbank rate] 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from our estimations. First, the coefficients of the 
ECB communication indicators are significantly different from zero, although in some 
cases only at the ten percent level, except for the KOF MPC. However, according to the 
KOF MPC, the ECB already starts preparing the general public for interest rate changes 
more than 1 meeting in advance. Once it is lagged by one period, the KOF MPC turns 
significant, while the lag of the other indicators is not significant. Second, also if the 
interbank rate is included, the ECB communication indicators remain significant. The 
latter result implies that the interbank interest rate, although it is always significant, does 
not contain all the information provided by the communication indicators. Figures 4 and 
5 show the implied probabilities of the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
As both figures show, the estimated probabilities quite heavily depend upon these 
indicators. Estimates of the marginal effects confirm this. For instance, a one standard 
deviation increase in the value of the Rosa and Verga indicator (while keeping the other 
explanatory variables equal to their means) increases the probability of an interest rate 
hike by close to 13.5 percentage points 
 
[Insert Figure 4: Probability estimates]   11
 
[Insert Figure 5: Probability estimates including the interbank rate] 
 
Finally, Table 5 shows the results for out of sample forecasts for three indicators that are 
available for years after 2004. Starting with the first interest rate decision in 2005, a total 
of 30 real-time one period ahead forecasts were produced. For each forecast the model 
was re-estimated to ensure that all information available at that moment in time was 
optimally used. The table shows the so-called Brier score (QPS) and the ranked 
probability score (RPS). Following Boero et al. (2009), these measures can be explained 



























∑         ( 8 )  
where  Pkt and Dkt are the density functions of pkt a n d  dkt,  respectively.  The  RPS 





t h e  f o r e c a s t s  i m p r o v e s  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  t h e  b a s e  m o d e l  w h e n  t h e  E C B  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  m o d e l  ( b o t h  t h e  Q P S and  RPS are 
closer  to  zero),  thereby  confirming  our  previous  findings.  Also i n  l i n e  w i t h  o u r  
previous findings is that the inclusion of the (non‐lagged) KOF MPC measure of ECB 
communication does not improve upon the quality of the forecasts.    12






[Insert: Table 5: Out of sample forecasting] 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Does it pay to watch the lips of the ECB President in order to forecast the next policy 
decision of the ECB, or does it suffice to base a forecast on the most recent information 
regarding expected inflation and output? We examine whether ECB communication adds 
information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which 
expected inflation and output are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication 
that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference 
following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are 
sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predicting 
the next policy decision of the ECB compared to the information provided by expected 
inflation and expected output growth. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is 
included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant. 
The latter result implies that the interbank interest rate does not contain all the 
information provided by the ECB communication indicators. 
   13
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Notes: The main refinancing rate and the one-month interbank money market rate stem 
from the ECB. Growth and inflation expectations are derived from the consensus 
forecasts as published by Consensus Economics Inc.    16
FIGURE 2 














































Notes: H&U, BHS, R&V and KOF MPC are the wording indicator of Heinemann and 
Ullrich (2007), the policy intention indicator of Berger et al. (2006), the updated Rosa 
and Verga (2007) indicator, and the KOF Monetary Policy Communicator as used by 
Conrad and Lamla (2007), respectively. Ullrich is the indicator of Ullrich (2008).   17
FIGURE 3 
THE TIMING IN OUR MODEL 
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Notes: The first figure does not include any communication indicators. The probabilities 
of the remaining figures are based upon the regressions reported in Table 3 and include 
both lags of the communication indicators. 
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FIGURE 5 









































































































































































































Notes: The first figure does not include any communication indicators. The probabilities 
of the remaining figures are based upon the regressions reported in Table 4 and include 
both lags of the communication indicators. 
 




(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
        
(1) MRR  -0.08 0.41 0.62 0.16 -0.15 -0.05
(2) IBRt=CF - MRR   -0.08 -0.21 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.06
(3) Inflation exp.   0.56 -0.25 0.02 0.28 0.18 0.18
(4) Growth exp.   0.59 0.34 0.07 0.55 0.21 0.16
(5) R&V 0.30 0.36 0.12 0.76 0.68 0.48
(6) H&U   0.26 0.29 0.16 0.70 0.75
(7) Ullrich -0.06 0.31 0.07 0.42 0.62 0.70 0.39
(8) BHS   0.32 0.40 0.17 0.78 0.88 0.79 0.61
(9) KOF MPC   -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.28  
Notes: The correlation coefficients reported in italic (lower-left triangle) use a fixed 
sample of 68 observations during 1999–2004. Each of the correlation coefficients 
reported in the upper-right part use the 96 observations which cover January 1999 until 
June 2007.  
   21
 
TABLE 2 
BASELINE MODEL: OLS AND ORDERED PROBIT MODELS 
  
(1) (2) (3)
MRRt-1 -0.109 ***   ρ  0.891 *** MRRt-1 -1.048 ***
(-3.53) (28.96) (-4.06)
Inflation exp.t=CF 0.154 * β 1.414 ** Inflation exp.t=CF 1.700 **
(1.74) (2.12) (2.50)
Growth exp.t=CF 0.187 *** γ 1.725 *** Growth exp.t=CF 1.756 ***
(4.18) (6.35) (4.93)













Notes: The sample uses all observations available during the 1999-2007 (June) period. In 
columns (1) and (2) t statistics are in parentheses. In column (3) robust z statistics are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 3 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS WITH ECB COMMUNICATION INDICATORS ADDED  
  
MRRt-1  -0.740 ** -0.995 *** -0.616 ** -1.009 ** -0.993 *** -0.748 ** -0.979 ** -0.776 *** -0.965 ** -0.864 ***
(-2.261) (-2.736) (-2.208) (-2.478) (-3.639) (-2.245) (-2.516) (-2.694) (-2.424) (-2.999)
Inflation exp.t=CF -0.153 0.121 0.611 -0.554 1.486 ** -0.153 -0.285 1.089 -0.502 1.043
(-0.190) (0.106) (0.775) (-0.561) (2.240) (-0.184) (-0.212) (1.282) (-0.497) (1.357)
Growth exp.t=CF 0.669 1.585 *** 1.316 *** 0.574 1.693 *** 0.665 1.285 ** 1.547 *** 0.617 1.494 ***
(1.372) (2.623) (3.201) (1.033) (4.357) (1.347) (2.011) (3.509) (1.109) (3.741)
Comm.ind.t-1 1.131 *** 0.451 * 1.189 *** 1.613 *** 0.764 1.099 *** 0.459 * 1.379 *** 1.717 *** 0.761
(3.891) (1.812) (3.909) (3.188) (0.972) (3.170) (1.846) (3.673) (2.857) (0.986)
Comm.ind.t-2 0.047 0.311 -0.519 * -0.210 1.928 ***



















(6) (7) (9) (10) (8)















Note: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS INCLUDING COMMUNICATION INDICATORS AND THE INTERBANK 
RATE 
  
MRRt-1  -0.406 -0.850 ** -0.441 -1.142 ** -0.747 *** -0.407 -0.853 ** -0.628 ** -1.120 ** -0.610 **
(-1.157) (-2.341) (-1.566) (-2.220) (-2.676) (-1.147) (-2.234) (-2.031) (-2.362) (-2.100)
IBRt=CF - MRRt-1 6.278 ** 7.284 *** 6.990 *** 7.452 *** 6.951 ** 6.266 ** 7.400 *** 7.533 *** 7.414 *** 6.858 **
(2.020) (2.586) (2.584) (2.774) (2.342) (2.014) (2.659) (2.887) (2.752) (2.136)
Inflation exp.t=CF 0.107 0.621 1.179 0.477 1.871 *** 0.083 0.704 1.806 ** 0.492 1.380 *
(0.123) (0.523) (1.455) (0.466) (2.817) (0.0905) (0.530) (2.083) (0.475) (1.894)
Growth exp.t=CF -0.046 1.031 * 0.812 * 0.369 1.136 *** -0.058 1.071 1.068 ** 0.376 0.934 **
(-0.084) (1.686) (1.949) (0.638) (2.778) (-0.103) (1.502) (2.276) (0.640) (2.284)
Comm.ind.t-1 1.125 *** 0.618 * 1.253 *** 1.777 *** 0.964 1.097 *** 0.612 * 1.518 *** 1.806 *** 0.948
(3.993) (1.686) (3.816) (3.375) (1.068) (3.189) (1.689) (3.378) (2.891) (1.074)
Comm.ind.t-2 0.044 -0.048 -0.741 ** -0.068 1.880 ***
(0.153) (-0.182) (-2.186) (-0.130) (2.671)
Observations
Log likelihood -23.44 -35.71 -35.53 -23.47 -37.73 -18.10
96 68 96 68
(6) (7) (9) (10) (8) (1) (2) (4) (5) (3)
R&V H&U BHS MPC Ullrich R&V H&U BHS MPC Ullrich
67 95
-45.00 -18.09 -42.75
95 67 95 96
-35.50  
Note: Robust z statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   24
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